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55 
Can We Rank Legal Systems According  
to Their Economic Efficiency? 
Claude Ménard∗  
Bertrand du Marais∗∗  
INTRODUCTION 
The issue of the impact of law, particularly business law, on the 
economy and growth, has become the topic of hot debates over the 
last several decades within the academy and among policy makers, 
particularly in the development agency community. For policy 
makers, this interest grew out of disillusionment in the 1980s over the 
effect of structural adjustment policies that have led development 
agencies to focus on the implementation of structural reforms. This in 
turn rapidly introduced into the picture a need to reform institutions, 
with special attention to the legal framework. The issue became 
particularly prominent on policy maker’s agendas with private 
foreign direct investments overriding public aid. Indeed, how could 
countries attract foreign investments without having the appropriate 
institutions providing guarantees for investors? 
There were, of course, preliminary investigations among 
theoreticians about the role of legal institutions before the 1980s that 
paved the way for the ongoing research, although these prior 
investigations often are neglected by practitioners (and some 
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researchers as well) who give the impression that they are reinventing 
the wheel. With regard to research about the impact of law and the 
legal system on economies, no one can ignore the seminal 
contributions of Ronald Coase. In his famous paper from 1960,1 
Coase showed that in absence of transaction costs, which is how 
mainstream economists were reasoning at the time, institutions such 
as legal systems do not matter and as a result that optimal solutions 
could be reached by agents through adequate renegotiations, 
regardless of the type of institutions. However, as soon as we enter a 
world with positive transaction costs, institutions play a crucial role 
in shaping the form that exchanges will take—and their costs. In this 
context, the impact of the legal system can not be ignored. Taking 
this approach as his point of departure, Douglass North developed an 
analysis of the crucial role of institutions over time for explaining 
development and growth but focused more on the political system 
than on the legal one.2  
However, it may be the practitioner and ideological agitator who 
was trained along the coasian model,3 Hernando de Soto, that 
contributed most significantly to the change of attitudes among 
development agencies. Examining the time and cost of setting up a 
new business in the poor suburbs of Lima, Peru, de Soto identified 
the weight that the absence of an adequate legal framework put on 
transactions in obliging parties to depend on the informal sector.4 
Indeed, he showed that: (i) poor are forced to remain within 
informality because the formal law is too complicated and 
cumbersome; (ii) informality imposes a dead weight loss, hindering 
the “hidden capital” of the poor to yield a proper return or to be used 
as collateral.5 With adequate property rights and a simplified formal 
legal system, this “dead capital” could provide leverage, bolstering 
growth and development.6  
 
 1. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 44 (1960). 
 2. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE (Cambridge University Press 1990). 
 3. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE ECONOMIC ANSWER TO TERRORISM 
(Harper and Row 1989) (1986). 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id.  
 6. Id.  
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These ideas melted with other sources in the framework 
developed by La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(“LLSV”), in the late 1990s.7 In a series of papers, they linked the 
legal framework to the development of financial markets and, 
through finance, to growth and development.8 The World Bank, 
among other institutions, caught these ideas and transformed what 
was initially a tentative correlation into normative guidelines.9 It is 
the purpose of this Article to show and criticize this process. Indeed, 
it is our conviction that this issue deserves attention because it is 
likely to remain a prominent fixture on the agenda of law and 
economics research as well as development agencies for at least the 
coming decade.  
Our analysis is developed as follows. Part I describes the history 
and methodology of the research conducted by LLSV. Part II 
examines the transformation of the correlation explored by LLSV 
into a normative approach that is illustrated particularly well by the 
series of reports from the International Finance Corporation (IFC—
World Bank Group) on Doing Business.10 Part III discusses the 
results exposed in these reports while considering the theoretical 
issues involved, which have to do with whether it makes sense to 
rank legal systems, and procedures considered for doing so. Part IV 
concludes with indications about what to expect from a sound 
comparative approach to legal systems combining law and 
economics. 
I. FROM CORRELATIONS TO CAUSALITY 
The initial papers by LLSV started as an effort to discover 
whether there was a correlation between the legal framework of a 
 
 7. Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1155 (1998). 
 8. Id.  
 9. See infra note 10. 
 10. WORLD BANK / INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, DOING BUSINESS IN 2004: 
UNDERSTANDING REGULATION (World Bank, IFC and Oxford University Press 2004) 
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING REGULATION]; WORLD BANK / INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 
CORPORATION, DOING BUSINESS IN 2005: REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH (World Bank, 
IFC and Oxford University Press 2005) [hereinafter REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH]; 
WORLD BANK / INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, DOING BUSINESS IN 2006: CREATING 
JOBS (World Bank, IFC and Oxford University Press 2006) [hereinafter CREATING JOBS]. 
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country and the development of its financial system, with the 
following underlying assumptions: (a) that there is a benchmark for 
“good” financial markets (the US model) and (b) that extensive 
financial markets command growth.11 The model was progressively 
transformed into a more general theory about the development of 
markets, ending up in a so-called “New Comparative Economics”12 
that inspired the normative approach proposed in Doing Business.13 
In this part, we examine this transformation from a broad, mainly 
inductive framework to a set of normative propositions. 
A. Revisiting LLSV: The “New Comparative Economics” 
A standard reference for understanding the theoretical framework 
behind the Doing Business project is the often quoted paper by LLSV 
on “The New Comparative Economics.”14 The starting point of the 
paper is that rights attached to securities, and the protection of 
shareholders and creditors is a major factor in explaining the 
development of financial markets.15 As stated in 1998, “shareholders 
receive dividends because they can vote out directors who do not pay 
them, and creditors are paid because they have power to repossess 
collateral.”16 The second step of the argument focuses on the idea that 
these rights depend on legal rules and their enforcement, since this 
delineates what rights security holders have legally and how well 
their rights are going to be protected.17 The next step then, logically, 
argues that characteristics of these rules and the environment framing 
their implementation will determine the possibility for financial 
markets to fully develop.18 A last step consists of identifying these 
environments. Two so-called “legal families” with respect to 
commercial laws, representing polar cases, were identified in the 
 
 11. La Porta et al., supra note 7, at 1117–26. 
 12. Andrei Shleifer et al., The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 595 
(2003). 
 13. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 14. La Porta et al., supra note 7.  
 15. Id. at 1113–17. 
 16. Id. at 1114. 
 17. Id. at 1116. 
 18. Id. at 1152. 
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1998 paper,19 and were later nuanced in the 2003 paper:20 first, the 
common law tradition, in which legal rules pertaining to the rights of 
investors and their enforcement would be the strongest, and second, 
the civil law tradition (also identified as the French tradition) that 
would provide the weakest protection, with the German and 
Scandinavian systems falling somewhere in-between.21 
While introducing several nuances, the 2003 paper by Djankov et 
al. basically restated the same propositions, namely that: (a) laws 
differ markedly around the world, limiting more or less investors’ 
rights, with a clear advantage to common law countries in that 
respect; (b) law enforcement differs a great deal around the world, 
and empirical observation would confirm that these differences 
reinforce the trend favorable to common law countries; and (c) 
different mechanisms, such as concentration, develop as a response to 
the poor protection of investors outside the common law countries, 
but they do the job quite inefficiently.22 
However, the manifesto that is developed in the “New 
Comparative Economics” paper goes further in at least two aspects. 
First, it explicitly assumes that there is a close relationship between 
“good” institutional design and economic development, and that 
countries with poor investor protections, either because of their legal 
system or because of the enforcement rules of this system, severely 
suffer in their economic dynamics.23 Demonstrating this relationship 
through statistical evidence is clearly the research strategy resulting 
from this proposition, a strategy that articulates the Doing Business 
project.24 Second, and quite significantly, the 2003 paper switches the 
focus of the analysis from comparative legal systems and their 
impact, which is a difficult research program to implement 
rigorously, to the investigation of the role of regulations on economic 
development and growth.25 Although the paper develops as if the 
regulatory approach would be rigorously embedded in the legal 
 
 19. Id. at 1117–21. 
 20. Shleifer et al., supra note 12, at 604–09. 
 21. La Porta et al., supra note 7, at 1113–55; see also Shleifer et al., supra note 12. 
 22. Shleifer et al., supra note 12, at 595–619. 
 23. La Porta et al., supra note 7, at 1120–21. 
 24. Id. at 1113–55. 
 25. Shleifer et al., supra note 12, at 595–619. 
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system approach, we submit that these are two substantially different 
stories, as we will illustrate below.26 However, the move had 
important consequences. In identifying legal systems as regulations 
implemented in different legal environments, it provided a way to 
deal with the measurement issue. In considering that regulations are 
representative of the legal systems in which they developed, LLSV 
reoriented the comparative analysis of legal system to the 
establishment of ranking procedures for ordering regulatory regimes 
according to their capacity to facilitate the organization of 
transactions. In providing support to the ranking of the different legal 
regimes, it opened the way to normative propositions, strongly 
oriented toward substituting common law regimes to other regimes 
whenever it is possible.27 
B. The “Doing Business” Reports 
Thus, the initial research program from LLSV progressively 
shifted toward the development of tools for ordering the relative 
efficiency of different systems, progressively identifying regulatory 
(administrative) regimes with the different legal systems in which 
they are more or less embedded. This move crystallized in the 
ongoing series of the IFC (World Bank Group) reports on Doing 
Business.28 The qualitative breakthrough of these reports compared to 
the initial papers is twofold. First, the successive reports intend to 
develop an increasingly sophisticated tool for measuring the 
aggregate performance of different systems, particularly legal ones.29 
Second, the reports unambiguously intend to derive prescriptive 
propositions from the LLSV research results in order to define a 
benchmark for comparing and evaluating legal systems worldwide, 
and for establishing policy recommendations.30 In this respect, the 
initial set of 1998 to 2000 papers from LLSV are undergoing a 
significant revision. However, the methodology has not changed 
 
 26. Id. at 595. 
 27. Id.  
 28. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
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much in the new version of these papers when compared to earlier 
ones.31 
II. “DOING BUSINESS”: WHAT IS IT’S ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK? 
The research program and the policy agenda defined by “Doing 
Business” are produced in the 2004 report.32 Although the wording of 
the subsequent reports (2005 and 2006) is more nuanced and 
polished, they are all derived from that initial framework.33  
The agenda established in these reports is unambiguous: it is to 
formulate prescriptions for developing as well as developed countries 
in order to bolster growth.34 The main tool for reaching this goal is to 
propose a standardization of law along the lines identified by the best 
legal practice, with the explicit proposal that “one size (can) fit all.”35 
From LLSV’s perspective, the analytical framework can be 
summarized in three main arguments.  
1. In accordance with the property rights theory as reformulated 
by de Soto, the capacity to define and implement property rights is a 
necessary condition for reducing informality. Reducing informality is 
a major hindrance to economic growth since people working in the 
informal sector cannot leverage their assets and because informality 
raises transaction costs by generating high rates of uncertainty among 
parties.36  
2. The negative effects of informality are even greater when 
applied to property rights because it inhibits two major micro-
economic components of growth: (a) the existence and development 
of entrepreneurship at the local level and (b) the capacity to attract 
foreign investments, which is a dimension that was not really 
significant to de Soto but that follows quite naturally from the LLSV 
approach.37 Indeed, when local financial markets are underdeveloped, 
 
 31. Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing 4–6 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W11883, 2006), available at http://www.istfin.eco. 
unisi.ch/flopez.pdf. 
 32. UNDERSTANDING REGULATION, supra note 10, at viii. 
 33. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 34. UNDERSTANDING REGULATION, supra note 10, at viii. 
 35. Id. at xvi. 
 36. REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH, supra note 10, at 33. 
 37. See supra notes 3 & 7 and accompanying text. 
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the capacity to attract investors from abroad becomes a strategic 
factor for development. 
3. In most cases, informality is a by-product of a formal legal 
framework that is unduly complicated and/or full of barriers to 
entrepreneurship. Therefore, for all countries, and particularly for low 
developed countries, which are plagued with inexistent or largely 
underdeveloped financial markets, reforms should be implemented in 
the legal system that could be conducive to foreign investments. Such 
a legal system has two significant advantages. First, it is oriented 
toward facilitating business and entrepreneurship, especially toward 
facilitating business for foreign investors.38 Second, it should be as 
simple as possible and should impose the lowest transaction costs 
possible. The central proposition derives from these two properties: 
legal systems should be evaluated and ranked according to their 
capacity to minimize delays in establishing a business and to 
maximize guarantees that property rights will be enforced, while the 
costs of getting these results should be minimized.39 The 
identification of the best legal system conforming to these criteria is a 
matter of empirical research. Hence, the methodology adopted for 
measuring and comparing the performance of different legal systems 
is very important.  
A. The “Doing Business” Methodology40 
In Doing Business, the assessment of the quality of a country’s 
legal system is based on the quantification of the quality of several 
legal procedures.41 Five “items” (related to procedures involved in 
doing business) were evaluated in the 2004 report and seven in 2005; 
 
 38. REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH, supra note 10, at 67. To illustrate, a bankruptcy 
law is stamped as “good” in Doing Business only if it is oriented toward the quick and large 
recovery of debts by creditors, with no consideration for the positive effects that debtor’s 
continuation of activity may have.  
 39. Id. at 3. 
 40. A description of this methodology appears in UNDERSTANDING REGULATION and in 
following reports in the “Data Notes” section: UNDERSTANDING REGULATION, supra note 10, at 
105–14; REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH, supra note 10, at 79–87; CREATING JOBS, supra 
note 10, at 77–89. 
 41. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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there are up to ten “items” in the 2006 report.42 These items were 
selected according to their presumed impact, either on the business 
climate (e.g., the capacity to enforce contracts as crucial to the 
development of transactions), or on macroeconomic aggregates (e.g., 
information available on potential debtors is crucial for creditors, 
therefore fostering credit, investment, and finally the GDP).43 
Each procedure is documented through several indices that are 
built according to what Doing Business calls “a time and motion” 
approach.44 In order to build these indices, the Doing Business team 
created a representative case for each item. This representative case is 
processed “as if” it were a sample, exemplifying the relationships that 
businessmen have with the country’s legal system in order to 
complete standard operations such as cashing an unpaid check, 
building a warehouse, etc.45 
Detailed questionnaires, sometimes fairly lengthy, are then sent to 
local lawyers and businessmen.46 The respondents have to compute 
the number of steps and the time and costs to perform each legal 
procedure pertaining to each case.47 They also answer questions 
about the presence of specific legal istruments within the country’s 
legal framework.48 Data is collected country by country, for each 
selected case using this method. Legal processes are represented 
through histograms.49 For many items, countries’ data are used to 
compute a set of partial composite indices. The resulting set of 
indicators is shown in Table 1. 
 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id.  
 44. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 45. Id. at 11. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. at 12. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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TABLE 1 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE “EASE OF DOING BUSINESS” INDEX,  
DOING BUSINESS 200550 
Items Sub indices Time and 
Motion 
Cost Occurrence of 
Certain Legal 
Patterns 
Others 
Quantitative 
Procedures Number    
Time Days    
Cost  % of 
income per 
capita 
  Starting a 
Business 
Minimum 
Capital 
   % of income 
per capita 
Difficulty of 
hiring index (1/3 
of rigidity of 
employment 
index) 
  Yes/No Type 
(score of 1 for the 
occurrence of a 
certain feature in 
the law) 
 
Rigidity of hours 
index (1/3 of 
rigidity of 
employment 
index) 
  Yes/No Type 
(score of 1 for the 
occurrence of a 
certain feature in 
the law) 
 
Difficulty of 
firing index (1/3 
of rigidity of 
employment 
index) 
  Yes/No Type 
(score of 1 for the 
occurrence of a 
certain feature in 
the law) 
 
Hiring Cost  % of salary   
Hiring and 
Firing Worker 
Firing Cost  weeks of 
salary 
  
Procedures Number    
Time Days    Registering 
Property Cost  % of 
property 
value 
  
 
 50. REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH, supra note 10, at 89–109; CREATING JOBS, 
supra note 10, at 95–109. Eight indices in this table compute the occurrence of certain specific 
features in a country’s substantive law. They are mostly significant in expressing the distance 
between the legal framework of a country on one hand, and the analytical framework adopted in 
the Doing Business reports on the other hand. Therefore, they are the most likely to express 
structural biases, which may also appear in other indices. These eight indices amount to thirty-
two percent of the final ranking. 
 Seven indices belong to the “time and motion” category. Those in this category compute 
the time required and the number of procedures to navigate the legal system. Therefore, they 
mostly capture the administrative burden and not the “quality” of the substance of the law in 
itself. 
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Items Sub indices Time and 
Motion 
Cost Occurrence of 
Certain Legal 
Patterns 
Others 
Quantitative 
Strength of legal 
index rights 
  Yes/No Type 
(score of 1 for the 
occurrence of a 
certain feature in 
the law) 
 
Depth of credit 
information 
index 
  Yes/No Type 
(score of 1 for the 
occurrence of a 
certain feature in 
the law) 
 
Public registry 
coverage 
   % of adults 
Getting Credit 
Private bureau 
coverage 
   % of adults 
Extent of 
disclosure index 
(1/3) 
  Yes/No Type: 
value from 0 to 10 
according to the 
occurrence of 
certain features in 
the law 
 
Extent of director 
liability index 
(1/3) 
  Yes/No Type: 
value from 0 to 10 
according to the 
occurrence of 
certain features in 
the law 
 Protecting 
Investors 
(Strength of 
investors 
protection 
index) 
Ease of 
shareholders 
suits index (1/3) 
  Yes/No Type: 
value from 0 to 10 
according to the 
occurrence of 
certain features in 
the law 
 
Procedures Number    
 
Time Days    
Enforcing 
contracts 
Cost  % of debt   
Time Years    
Cost  % of estate   Closing a 
Business Recovery rate    Cents on the 
dollar 
Average: “ease 
of doing 
business” 
index in DB 
2006 
25 (100%)  7 (28%) 6 (24%) 8 (32%) 4 (16%) 
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Based on these indicators, countries are then ranked by percentile 
according to each procedure. A country’s percentile rank for each 
item is the average of its percentile ranks on partial indices. The final 
step consists on ranking a country’s global “Ease of Doing Business” 
according to the simple average of its partial percentile ranks. Doing 
Business reports therefore establish a scoreboard of countries.51 
Doing Business 2006 is the first of these reports having a worldwide 
coverage, from the Fiji Islands to the U.S.52 
  B. The Fascination of Ranking 
The database established for Doing Business combines very 
attractive features. First, it represents a huge amount of data, very 
often collected directly for the needs of the database, for ten different 
items (and several partial indices for each of them) in 155 countries 
in the 2006 report (the database has significantly been extended from 
one report to the other).53 Second, the indices used are easy to 
understand and to publicize. Third, data and the relevant indices are 
then synthesized in a general scoreboard that can be easily advertised 
through mass media.54 
This “Ease of Doing Business” index, publicized by the IFC 
(World Bank Group), is not the only benchmark available for 
assessing the “quality” of legal framework or institutions.55 However, 
this is the first time to our knowledge that a public international 
organization has published such a “scoreboard.”56 Moreover, this 
scoreboard is also used internally by the World Bank to determine the 
conditionality imposed on borrowing countries.57 Therefore, the 
 
 51. CREATING JOBS, supra note 10, at 110–61. 
 52. Id.  
 53. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. For a list of indices, see UNDERSTANDING REGULATION, ch. 1 (the section entitled, 
“Other Indicators in a Crowded Field”).  
 56. Id. The OECD’s report on “Going for Growth” does not publicize its data in the form 
of a scoreboard. 
 57. Peter Bakvis, How the World Bank & IMF Use the Doing Business Report to Promote 
Labour Market Deregulation in Developing Countries, MIMEO, ICFTU/GLOBAL UNIONS 
(2006), available at http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991224958&Language= 
EN. 
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impact of Doing Business is far from negligible, not only in 
academia, but also, and even more so, among policy makers and 
development agencies worldwide. 
To summarize, the Doing Business reports develop positive 
indicators in order to draw normative conclusions about what is and 
should be a “good” legal system, that is: a system maximizing speed 
and minimizing transaction costs, thus conducive to foreign 
investments and growth.58 The measures proposed are deal oriented 
because they evaluate the speed and the costs of doing business at the 
point where a transaction is initiated and from the viewpoint of the 
party initiating the transaction.59 
 III. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS FROM “DOING BUSINESS”  
The Doing Business reports have had an increasing impact both in 
academia and on decision makers, particularly on the level of 
ideological discussions. Indeed, changing “real” institutions in order 
to reach what would be an ideal benchmark is another story than 
discussing the virtues and vices of different legal systems. However, 
notwithstanding their imperfection and biases, the reports have the 
merit of having put high on the agenda the analysis of institutions, 
particularly of legal regimes, as a key factor for understanding 
development and growth as well as inhibitions of economic forces. 
As such, the reports deserve attention. There are two ways for 
discussing Doing Business. One is to reexamine carefully the 
underlying model as developed initially by LLSV.60 The other is to 
look at the results developed in the reports and their underlying 
methodology. In the following parts, we focus on the second 
approach. 
 
 58. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 59. Id.  
 60. See La Porta et al., supra note 7. Discussions in that direction are provided in several 
chapters of section III, Legal Institutions of a Market Economy, in MENARD and SHIRLEY. 
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A. A Poor Explanatory Power61 
Technically speaking, the results proposed in Doing Business’ 
reports are actually quite disappointing, particularly when it comes to 
the significance of their global index (“ease of doing business”).62 
The explanatory power of the variables appears to be quite low and 
does not confirm the promises of their analytical framework. 
However, part of its weaknesses are likely rooted in the difficulties of 
building an adequate database on these issues. 
According to the assumptions developed in Doing Business and 
derived from LLSV (1998), and conditional to the quality of the 
database and the calculations based on these data, there should exist a 
strong relationship between a “sound legal framework” and several 
macroeconomic variables, particularly Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDI), which are underlying the entire project, and Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), which is its primary target. 
The 2005 report went as far as possible in that direction in trying 
to establish such a relationship.63 The 2006 report, which is not 
discussed here, goes a step further, in that it uses the data to rank all 
155 countries of the database.64 The 2005 report identified “good 
performers” according to an “ease of doing business” index built as 
the average of several “item indices.”65 However, the comparison of 
 
 61. This section relies on a preliminary note by Didier Blanchet, “Analyses exploratoires 
des indices proposés par les Rapports Doing Business 2005 et 2006 de la Banque mondiale” 
written in September 2005 and its 2006 revision based on the 2006 Doing Business report. The 
main results are published in Des Indicators Pour Mesurer le Droit? by du Marais. See infra 
note 66. As emphasized in Blanchet, three dimensions should be considered when evaluating 
the methodology of a project like Doing Business. First, what is the quality of the data 
collected? Second, what is the quality of the aggregated indicators (when they result from 
aggregation)? Third, how significant are the variables thus constructed with respect to the 
unexplained variables? In our discussion, we focus on this third dimension. 
 62. See supra note 10. 
 63. REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH, supra note 10. 
 64. CREATING JOBS, supra note 10. 
 65. REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH, supra note 10, at 87. The composite index “ease 
in doing business” is constructed in three steps: (i) Variables in the database are transformed 
into ranking variables; (ii) For each of the seven domains covered in 2005, simple averages are 
calculated (it should be noted that not all variables for each domain are taken into account, with 
no obvious explanation for variables dropped from the calculation); (iii) resulting ranks for the 
seven domains are then averaged as well, giving way to the final rank for each country on the 
database. Id.  
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this composite index with statistics on FDI, the growth of GDP, and 
the rate of investments, provides poor indications that the index is 
really significant, as pointed out in Blanchet,66 but also, to a certain 
extent, in Djankov et al.67 Blanchet estimated a relatively simple 
regression analysis between the “ease of doing business index” and 
variations in four macroeconomic variables considered as particularly 
significant in the Doing Business reports as well as in the underlying 
model.68 The methodology is close to the one developed by Gregoir 
and Maurel who discussed the World Economic Forum report.69 
Table 2 summarizes the main results of this simulation and our 
comments on the coefficients.70 
 
 66. Didier Blanchet, Analyses exploratoires des indices proposés par les Rapports Doing 
Business 2005 et 2006 de la Banque mondiale, in DES INDICATORS POUR MESURER LE DROIT? 
LES LIMITES METHODOLOGIQUES DES RAPPORTS DOING BUSINESS (Bertrand du Marais ed., 
2006). 
 67. Simeon Djankov et al., Regulation and Growth, 92 ECON. LETTERS 395 (2006). 
 68. Blanchet, supra note 66. Since the exact methodology for weighting variables is not 
explicated in the 2005 report and in the associated database posted on the World Bank website 
(http://rru.worldbank.org/doingbusiness), Blanchet reconstituted the weighted composite index, 
with results that are close enough to the one obtained by the World Bank team to make these 
results significant. Id.  
 69. Gregoir, Stephane & Françoise Maurel, Les Indices de Compétitivité des Pays: 
Interpretations et Limites, in CONSEIL D’ANALYSE ECONOMIQUE, COMPETITIVITE, RAPPORT 40 
(Michèle Dubonneuil & Lionel Fontagnè eds., 2003). 
 70. T-Students are negative since the composite index defines rank variable as increasing 
with the difficulty to do business: the more difficult it is to do business, the higher rank a 
country has (e.g., in the 2006 report, New Zealand is ranked first, Switzerland 17, Botswana 40, 
France 44, and Congo (Rep. Dem.) being the last (155)). 
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TABLE 2 
THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF THE “EASE OF DOING BUSINESS 
INDEX” 
 
Dependent 
variables 
Independent 
variables 
∆ GDP 
(between 
1999 and 
2003) 
FDI 
(as % of 
GDP) 
INVESTMENTS 
(as % of GDP) 
HDI 
Control 
Variable 
(GDP/capita) 
 
-0.000962 
(-3.21) 
0.0000998 
(1.58) 
-0.0001327 
(-1.73) 
0.0000069 
(4.77) 
Ease of 
Doing 
Business 
index 
 
-0.0315936 
(-4.24) 
-0.009475 
(-0.60) 
-0.04367 
(-2.29) 
-0.002371 
(-6.61) 
Constant 
 
4.82913 
(7.05) 
4.113988 
(2.85) 
25.59038 
(14.67) 
0.8121173 
(24.60) 
R2 0.1229 0.055 0.0398 0.5897 
Comments 
on 
coefficients: 
 
Explanatory 
power: 
Significant 
 
 
Marginal 
Non 
significant 
 
Nul 
Significant  
(but low) 
 
Low 
Significant 
Significant 
 Note: Parentheses=T-Student. 
In other terms, a basic test used by macroeconomists shows the 
weak explanatory power of the synthetic index built in Doing 
Business. The one exception is the variation in Human Development 
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Index (HDI), for which the explanatory power of the index is 
significant. However, this relationship is difficult to interpret 
unambiguously; it could very well be that HDI and the “ease of doing 
business” are both dependant on the level of the GDP or another 
factor. More important, the index seems to provide no explanation at 
all about the effect of law and regulations on FDI and very little hint 
on its effect on growth. Regressions between the same dependent 
variables and the seven specific indices of the 2005 report do not 
perform better. Last, even when constructing a new estimated index 
of “the ease of doing business” by changing the parameters in the 
seven indices in order to simulate different results improves the 
results a bit, it does not really exhibit significantly better explanatory 
power of the composite index. 
We are aware, of course, that these tests remain somewhat too 
simplistic. There may be many reasons why the explanatory power 
remains weak. The structure of the model should be explored more 
carefully and variables not related to the index should be taken into 
consideration. For example, more refined tests should include more 
control variables, e.g., when testing the impact of the “ease in doing 
business index” on FDI. One problem is that FDI is itself a rather 
ambiguous variable. Its variations are hard to explain and may be 
more related to physical and human capital available than to 
institutional variables such as the legal system. Moreover, some 
recent empirical studies suggest that FDIs are best correlated to 
institutions when using gravitation models.71 
What is even more striking is that the test done by the Doing 
Business team itself is not more conclusive. While testing the “ease 
of doing business” index against GDP growth, for example, Djankov 
et al. found that their index is positively and significantly related with 
growth.72 However, the explanatory power of the index is very low, 
even with standard control variables.73 
 
 71. Agnès Bénassy-Quéré et al., Institutional Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment 
(CEPII Working Paper No. 2005—05, 2005). 
 72. Djankov et al., supra note 67, at tbl.2. Its impact on the variation of GDP has a 
coefficient of 4.55. 
 73. The T-Student is at -1.138 and the R2 is 0.09. 
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B. Methodological Issues at Stake: What to Measure and How to 
Measure It? 
We believe that these rather weak results are the consequence of 
the methodology used by the Doing Business team while constructing 
the index. In what follows, we would like to challenge several aspects 
of the research strategy adopted, providing examples of the biases 
that it introduced. 
1. What to Measure? 
The underlying and ultimate goal of the Doing Business project is 
to measure the comparative efficiency of legal systems, understood as 
a set of laws and regulations.74 This was clearly stated in the initial 
2004 report, which is aligned to the LLSV model that inspired the 
project.75 However, this goal is less emphasized in the following 
reports, maybe because the authors became aware of the difficulties 
involved. Nevertheless, we share with the Doing Business team 
involved in this project the idea that a comparative approach is 
definitely needed to assess strength and flaws of different legal 
systems, and that we should implement measures whenever it is 
possible. However, in order to proceed convincingly in that direction, 
determining exactly what must be measured is crucial. In our view, 
there are very decisive choices to be made in that respect that not 
only have a methodological dimension, but also an analytical 
background and even some philosophical dimensions. Let us 
illustrate the difficulties at stake by examining several questions that 
a project like Doing Business must answer. 
2. Laws or Administrative Procedures? 
As already mentioned, the methodology adopted in Doing 
Business is mainly oriented toward computing the time and cost of 
the different stages that a legal framework requires in order to 
 
 74. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 75. UNDERSTANDING REGULATION, supra note 10, at ix, xvi; see La Porta et al., supra 
note 7, at 16–17 and accompanying text. 
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perform a given economic transaction.76 Therefore, Doing Business 
really does not examine the efficiency of specific laws.77 It rather 
focuses on the administrative process imposed on businesses as a 
(partial) extension of the legal system. In other words, it examines the 
administrative burden of a given system rather than the efficiency or 
inefficiency of the laws.78 This is no surprise since Doing Business 
deals with “investigating the regulations that enhance business 
activity and those that constrain it.”79 However, it also means that it is 
very difficult to disentangle the costs of administrative inefficiencies 
from costs of the characteristics of the legal regime. The goal 
assigned to the report, as suggested by the quotation above, well 
illustrates this ambiguity: “regulation” is difficult to clearly define 
and identify since it encompasses laws applicable to firms, and the 
processes used by public agencies and bureaus to implement these 
laws. 
3. Laws as Established Formally or Their Enforcement? 
Indeed, the ambiguity noted above extends to a mix between the 
domain of validity of a law and the conditions of its enforcement. 
Laws are usually established to cover a relatively wide variety of 
situations. Their implementation and enforcement form an 
intermediate body of rules oriented towards the application of general 
laws to specific cases. This is so in both the Civil Code tradition and 
the Common Law tradition. Doing Business does not seriously 
consider the implications of the complex relationship between these 
two dimensions.80 Instead, it basically considers enforcing 
mechanisms as common and similar for all types of contracts, and 
even assumes the same for all types of business transactions.81 On the 
contrary, as is well known by lawyers and judges, observation of 
legal commercial systems show that the more sophisticated the legal 
frameworks have more specific enforcement mechanisms. To a 
 
 76. UNDERSTANDING REGULATION, supra note 10, at 2–7. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. 
 79. CREATING JOBS, supra note 10, at 1. 
 80. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 81. Id.  
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certain extent, the multiplicity of specific enforcement mechanisms 
may be a cause of inefficiency, so that a legal system that remains at 
too high a level of generality may be more costly than a system with 
better defined laws because it needs so many intermediations, an 
issue that is debated among researchers comparing legal systems.82 
Conversely, a law that says nothing about its specific enforcement 
mechanisms may well provide incentives for using informal 
structure. In order to be more convincing, Doing Business should take 
into account these problems, or at least point out the difficulties they 
raise. Currently, the various reports simply ignore this aspect, which 
seriously weakens the ranking they intend to establish.83 
4. Legal Regimes or the Actual Life of Legal Regimes? 
The “time and motion” methodology adopted for establishing 
Doing Business does not capture the actual practice of laws, such as 
the way case laws or statutes are interpreted, the probability and 
effects of conflicts among different laws, or the behavior of economic 
agents playing with these rules in order to expedite their transactions.  
Any of these three limitations resulting from the methodology 
adopted in Doing Business could explain why the scores of countries 
from the European Union vary so widely.84 Indeed, if we look at the 
data provided by the 2006 report on the fifteen initial member states 
of the European Union, the dispersion is very large, even with respect 
to items for which laws among these countries have been quite 
exhaustively harmonized long ago.85 Clearly, the explanation for 
these variations lies in factors other than the laws. This question also 
arises when we look at the overall scoreboard for all countries, for 
items where international laws set minimum standards, such as labor 
laws. In that respect, the implicit judgment and implication derived 
from Doing Business’ reports by their authors, who suggest that there 
could be advantages in suppressing protections of the labor force set 
 
 82. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual 
Commitments, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 175 (C. Ménard & M. 
Shirley eds., Springer 2005). 
 83. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 84. Id.  
 85. See CREATING JOBS, supra note 10. 
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by the International Labor Organization’s minimum standards is quite 
surprising.86 Indeed, these standards are implemented even among the 
best performing countries and are considered an important tool for 
ensuring fair international competition.87 Once more, Doing Business 
is clearly missing or confusing something here that may be related to 
a methodology that weighs all items similarly, thus overstating or 
undervaluating some of them.88 
C. How to Measure? 
These problems, among others, are indubitably rooted in a 
difficult issue: how to measure the economic impact of legal systems 
and, more generally, of institutions. In that respect, we must be 
grateful to the IFC (World Bank Group) and the authors of the 
successive reports for putting this question high on the research 
agenda of economists (and, to a lesser degree, of lawyers specializing 
in comparative analysis), and taking the risk of proposing measures. 
Nevertheless, there are some surprising aspects in the way the reports 
have proceeded so far. A few examples are detailed below. 
1. Ex Ante v. Ex Post  
Economists are usually careful about the differences in measuring 
an economic phenomenon ex ante (e.g., estimating the anticipated 
growth rate) and measuring its ex post outcome (e.g., actual 
investments and their impact on growth). When it comes to the 
analysis of the impact of the legal system on the economy of a 
country, one would expect a careful distinction between trying to 
assess legal efficiency ex ante. For example, economists would 
normally look at the potential costs that a legal system can impose on 
transactions, and evaluate its consequences ex post, which involves 
taking into account the actual conditions of implementation and 
enforcement of this legal system.  
 
 86. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id.  
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As already suggested in the previous subsection, Doing Business 
reports are somewhat ambiguous in that respect.89 They intend to 
establish a comparative ex ante assessment of the efficiency of law 
through a quasi-physical computation of the legal process involved in 
an actual economic transaction.90 Doing so, they miss a very crucial 
issue: the conditions under which laws are actually implemented. 
Indeed, implementation of laws is often extremely different from the 
rationale behind a law’s design. In that respect, it is amazing that the 
reports do not take into account a major factor: the capacity of a legal 
system, through its implementation, to reduce or eliminate legal 
uncertainties surrounding transactions, and the existence (or not) of a 
legal system that can enforce deals made by parties in a contractual 
arrangement.91 Another puzzling black hole is the total absence of 
consideration for parties other than businessmen, such as consumers, 
suppliers, fiscal authorities, and agencies in charge of environmental 
policies, who may bear a significant part of the consequences of the 
legal systems in their different capacities to get rules of the game 
implemented. In sum, the reports tend to entirely neglect the indirect 
costs and benefits of different legal systems as well as their social 
costs and value. 
2. How to Build a Universal Benchmark Without Biases? 
Another weakness that is quite surprising in reports that intend to 
take into account fundamental institutions involved in the easiness or 
difficulty of doing business is that they neglect some basic rules for 
effective comparative studies. Unfortunately, the reports ignore these 
well-known rules to all those involved in comparative studies 
because the reports are so eager to establish the universal superiority 
of some systems over others. Again, let us illustrate briefly. 
In order to make international comparison easier, the team in 
charge of Doing Business defines and uses the same sample of case 
 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. This statement requires an important nuance: Doing Business devotes a specific 
chapter to contract enforcement. However, as we will show below, the approach adopted for 
doing so is highly questionable from a methodological standpoint.  
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studies for all countries under review.92 The goal is clearly and 
respectably to make the analysis and the propositions it supports 
universal, with general validity. However, the implementation of this 
method by selecting specific cases that would be the same for each 
country endorses a very strong and implicit assumption, which is that 
in all countries the same legal patterns are used to solve the same 
type of business issues. As lawyers specializing in comparative 
analysis of legal systems have known for centuries, this is not so. The 
real issue is identifying and comparing the many ways through which 
the same issue is tackled in different legal environments and in 
different countries. 
Let us illustrate this with the important example of contract 
enforcement (the item: “enforcing a contract”, in Doing Business 
reports). The authors of the reports substantiate this item through the 
specific case of the easiness (in terms of time, and therefore of costs) 
of recovering a bounced check, which is the approach already chosen 
by Djankov et al.93 Unfortunately, this example is not relevant in 
many countries, where failing to pay a check is a criminal offense, as 
for instance in Australia. In many countries, a bounced check is 
punished by a prison sentence. Therefore, the amount of time and the 
associated costs of getting a bounced check paid are actually 
irrelevant in terms of the efficiency of contract enforcement. A 
criminal penalty may or may not be a sufficient deterrent, and may or 
may not coexist with cumbersome enforcement procedures. 
Assessing the comparative efficiency of as “simple” a procedure as 
recovering a bounced check thus requires taking into account very 
different ways of dealing with the same problem. 
The same critique can be raised against many of the “regulation 
items” covered in Doing Business. For instance, fifty percent of the 
“getting credit index” is based on two measures of the information 
coverage: public credit registry and/or private credit bureau.94 In 
order to enter into the index, these public or private institutions must 
meet the criterion that they collect data, both negative and positive, 
 
 92. UNDERSTANDING REGULATION, supra note 10, at x. 
 93. Shleifer et al., supra note 12. 
 94. CREATING JOBS, supra note 10, at 82–83. 
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on debtors.95 For private bureaus, for example, the reports state that 
“credit investigative bureaus and credit reporting firms that do not 
directly facilitate information exchange between financial institutions 
are not considered.”96 Therefore, all information available by other 
means than private credit bureaus, e.g., through the financial 
information developed by the private industry, which often originates 
in specific filing obligations, is not taken into account and leads to a 
“zero” score.97 This clearly introduces a major bias regarding the 
quality of information available to creditors in most legal systems. 
Moreover, it is highly questionable to build an index about the quality 
of the information for “getting credit” that is expressed as a 
percentage of the adult population, while the goal of the index is to 
assess the information available for businessmen.98 
In sum, the efforts of the Doing Business team to identify and 
isolate a sample of cases making possible comparisons across 
countries may appear as a sound methodological choice at first 
glance. However, a more careful examination of the procedure’s 
implementation shows major biases because the authors neglected 
some basic rules known to specialists of comparative studies. Indeed, 
building ex ante a sample of specific cases that would be valid 
universally does not capture the variety of solutions devised by each 
national legal system and, therefore, relying on the ex post conditions 
to determine the actual costs of doing business in these different 
environment is inadequate. Building a relevant index would require 
taking into account both ex ante and ex post conditions. This idea is 
illustrated through attempts to measure and compare GDP because it 
shows that it is meaningless to determine the income per capita 
without taking into account the purchasing power of those receiving 
this income. Similarly, it is meaningless to asses the costs of doing 
business in different legal systems without taking into account the 
many different ways adopted by different legal systems for dealing 
with similar issues. 
 
 95. Id. at 83. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. This ratio is even more surprising if we consider the specific questionnaire used by 
the Doing Business team to document this index because it asks the number of firms surveyed 
by public registries or private bureaus. 
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We can therefore look at Doing Business reports as merely an 
assessment of the distance between a sample of cases, which reflect 
an ideal model of law, or rather the legal system that the authors are 
accustomed to, and the diversity of ways with which different 
countries with different legal systems are dealing when confronted 
with these particular cases. As Doing Business rightly points out, this 
variety may, to a certain extent, stem from phenomena opposed to 
sound economic growth such as heritage from legal tradition or rent 
seeking behaviors.99 However, we cannot ignore that this variety also 
reflects ways to efficiently address social and economic specificities 
of different countries. In that respect, having competing systems may 
be better than wanting full homogeneity! 
CONCLUSION: RANKING V. MEASURING 
There is now a general agreement among economists and among 
scholars working in the area of law and economics that legal systems 
matter for understanding what is going on in economies as they are. 
Institutions are no longer considered as exogenously given and of no 
interest for economic analysis or falling out of its domain of 
investigation. Notwithstanding substantial changes in that respect, 
there is still a long way to go, which makes the development of 
programs particularly relevant on law and economics, and on the 
interaction between institutions and economies. 
In this Article, we have discussed the recent reports from the IFC 
(World Bank Group) about Doing Business, to illustrate the 
difficulties facing scholars and policy makers who want to take into 
account the crucial role of institutions in explaining development and 
growth.100 It seems as though Doing Business made a major 
breakthrough, first in ranking legal traditions (Doing Business, 2004), 
then in measuring the “efficiency” of the legal environments of 
different countries, and finally establishing the “rank” of these 
countries according to certain variables, particularly their capacity to 
attract foreign investments (Doing Business, 2005 and especially 
 
 99. See generally UNDERSTANDING REGULATION, supra note 10, at 1–2. 
 100. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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2006).101 However, we have argued that in their existing approach, 
the reports create an illusion. They pretend to measure the role of 
legal systems according to their economic efficiency. What they 
actually do is rank countries according to a set of indices in which the 
real properties and specificities of legal systems are almost never 
captured. Analyzing their model and the data collected shows that, 
notwithstanding the interest one can find in the tentative, the reports 
end up with a superficial ranking rather than actually measuring the 
real impact of specific legal instruments. Instead, they identify the 
market power of some countries in fixing the rules of the game, that 
is, the legal tools used in making transactions rather than the role of 
legal systems as determinants for foreign direct investors. 
However, our critique does not intend to deter future research on 
the central issue raised by Doing Business. It is actually quite the 
opposite. We consider it a significant step that an organization like 
the World Bank began to look seriously at institutions, and 
particularly at legal systems as a key determinant in the explanation 
of development and growth. However, we also consider it to be 
essential that we not embark on the wrong path, going to the wrong 
place or, even worse, going nowhere. Measuring the economic 
impact of legal systems is a complex business that needs more 
conceptual refinement and the careful development of an appropriate 
methodology. Otherwise, it reflects only ideological biases. We still 
have a long way to go in order to find the right direction. 
 
 101. Id.  
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